

115TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

**S.** \_\_\_\_\_

To promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and for other purposes.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. CARDIN (for himself, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. MERKLEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. SCHATZ, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. BOOKER, Mr. MARKEY, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. COONS, Ms. CANTWELL, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. WYDEN, Ms. HARRIS, Mr. CASEY, Mr. KAINE, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

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**A BILL**

To promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and  
for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Burma Human Rights  
5 and Freedom Act of 2018”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The United States policy of principled en-  
9 gagement since 1988 has fostered positive demo-

1        cratic reforms in Burma, which have led to signifi-  
2        cant milestones on the path to full democracy.

3            (2) On November 8, 2015, Burma held historic  
4        elections in which the National League for Democ-  
5        racy won a supermajority of seats in the combined  
6        national parliament. On March 30, 2016, Htin  
7        Kyaw was inaugurated as the President of Burma,  
8        the country's first civilian President in more than 50  
9        years. Aung San Suu Kyi, President of the National  
10       League for Democracy, was barred from becoming  
11       President due to the provisions of section 59(f) of  
12       the 2008 Constitution, and therefore assumed the  
13       office of State Counsellor, a position created for her  
14       that made her the country's de facto leader.

15           (3) Aung San Suu Kyi's first acts as State  
16       Counsellor after her National League for Democracy  
17       party took office included releasing more than 100  
18       political prisoners, including well-known journalists  
19       and student activists held on politically motivated  
20       charges. However, as of November 2017, there were  
21       228 political prisoners in Burma, 46 of which were  
22       serving prison sentences, 49 of which were awaiting  
23       trial inside prison, and 133 of which were awaiting  
24       trial outside prison, according to the Assistance As-  
25       sociation for Political Prisoners.

1           (4) The Government of Burma also continues  
2 to systematically discriminate against the Rohingya  
3 people. Burma's 1982 citizenship law stripped  
4 Rohingya Burmese of their Burmese citizenship,  
5 rendering them stateless, and the Government con-  
6 tinues to restrict Rohingya births and to deny the  
7 Rohingya freedom of movement and access to  
8 healthcare, land, education, voting, political partici-  
9 pation, and marriage.

10           (5) Despite the meaningful steps taken toward  
11 democracy in Burma, there remain important struc-  
12 tural and systemic impediments to the realization of  
13 a fully democratic civilian government, including—

14           (A) the 2008 Constitution, which is in  
15 need of reform;

16           (B) the disfranchisement of certain groups  
17 who voted in previous elections;

18           (C) the social, political, and economic con-  
19 ditions in Rakhine State, particularly with re-  
20 spect to the Rohingya population; and

21           (D) the current humanitarian and human  
22 rights crisis affecting Burma's Rohingya popu-  
23 lation and residents of the Rakhine, Kachin,  
24 and Shan states, including credible reports of  
25 ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,

1           extrajudicial killings, sexual and gender-based  
2           violence, and forced displacement.

3           (6) Actions of the military of Burma, known as  
4           the Tatmadaw, including continuing assaults on per-  
5           sonnel and territory controlled by armed ethnic orga-  
6           nizations, military offensives immediately preceding  
7           the peace conference in Naypyitaw, and human  
8           rights violations against noncombatant civilians in  
9           conflict areas, undermine confidence in establishing  
10          a credible nationwide ceasefire agreement to end  
11          Burma's civil war.

12          (7) The people of Burma continue to suffer  
13          from an ongoing civil war between the Tatmadaw  
14          and nearly 20 armed ethnic organizations. Any pros-  
15          pects for a full democracy in Burma are contingent  
16          on ending the civil war and finding a path toward  
17          national reconciliation between Burma's Bamar ma-  
18          jority and its various ethnic minorities.

19          (8) Since 2011, over 98,000 people have been  
20          displaced in Kachin and northern Shan State over  
21          the escalating violence and instability, resulting in  
22          continued massive internal displacement, including  
23          in internally displaced person (IDP) camps, which  
24          continues to undermine the trust necessary to  
25          achieve a durable, lasting peace, and has caused a

1 massive humanitarian crisis which disproportionately  
2 affects the lives of innocent civilians and internally  
3 displaced persons forced from their homes. Accord-  
4 ing to the United Nations Office for the Coordina-  
5 tion of Humanitarian Affairs, some 50 percent of  
6 these displaced persons are staying in areas beyond  
7 Government control where humanitarian access is  
8 limited. Even in areas controlled by the Government,  
9 delivery of humanitarian assistance has been in-  
10 creasingly restricted through onerous bureaucratic  
11 requirements resulting in limited access by inter-  
12 national and local humanitarian organizations.

13 (9) In 2015, the nongovernmental campaign  
14 Global Witness found that, in 2014, the estimated  
15 value of official production of jade equated to up to  
16 48 percent of the official gross domestic product of  
17 Burma. Because of corruption and a lack of trans-  
18 parency, much of the proceeds of the Burmese jade  
19 trade enrich notorious leaders from the military  
20 junta, including former dictator Than Shwe and  
21 United States-sanctioned drug lord Hsueh Kang  
22 Wei, and vested interests in jade are undermining  
23 prospects for resolving the most intractable armed  
24 conflict in Burma.

1           (10) On August 31, 2016, State Counsellor  
2           Aung San Suu Kyi and the Government of Burma  
3           initiated the Union Peace Conference 21st Century  
4           Panglong in Naypyitaw, which more than 1,400 rep-  
5           resentatives of various concerned parties attended in  
6           an effort to begin the process of ending Burma’s  
7           civil war and to discuss options in forming a demo-  
8           cratic state of Burma. On May 24, 2017, the Gov-  
9           ernment of Burma held a second Panglong Peace  
10          Conference, with mixed results.

11          (11) On January 4, 2018, the Department of  
12          State determined that Burma remains designated as  
13          a country of particular concern for religious freedom  
14          under section 402(b) of the International Religious  
15          Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)), and that “mem-  
16          bers of the Rohingya community in particular face  
17          abuses by the Government of Burma, including  
18          those involving torture, unlawful arrest and deten-  
19          tion, restricted movement, restrictions on religious  
20          practices, discrimination in employment, and access  
21          to social services”.

22          (12) The February 2017 panels set up by the  
23          Burmese army and the Home Affairs Ministry are  
24          widely perceived by the international community to  
25          lack independence and impartiality. The December

1       2016 commission established by Burma’s President  
2       Htin Kyaw to investigate the October 2016 attacks  
3       dismissed claims of misconduct by security forces  
4       due to “insufficient evidence.” A Burmese army in-  
5       ternal inquiry completed in November 2017 claimed  
6       there had been no abuses committed by the military.  
7       The 2012 commission government established to in-  
8       vestigate violence in Rakhine State that year never  
9       held anyone accountable.

10           (13) In a public address on October 12, 2017,  
11       State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi laid out 3 goals  
12       for the Rakhine State:

13           (A) Repatriation of those who have crossed  
14       over to Bangladesh and effective provision of  
15       humanitarian assistance.

16           (B) Resettlement of displaced populations.

17           (C) Economic development and durable  
18       peace.

19           (14) According to the Médecins Sans Frontières  
20       estimates, at least 6,700 Rohingya have been killed,  
21       including 730 children, and that at least 2,700 oth-  
22       ers died from disease and malnutrition and over an  
23       estimated 680,000 Rohingya have fled to Ban-  
24       gladesh since August 2017, fearing loss of livelihood

1 and shelter and disproportionate use of force by the  
2 military of Burma.

3 (15) On October 23, 2017, the Department of  
4 State said, “We express our gravest concern with re-  
5 cent events in Rakhine State and the violent, trau-  
6 matic abuses Rohingya and other communities have  
7 endured. It is imperative that any individuals or en-  
8 tities responsible for atrocities, including non-state  
9 actors and vigilantes, be held accountable.”.

10 (16) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
11 hearing on October 24, 2017, the Department of  
12 State indicated that “refugees continue to cross into  
13 Bangladesh, and we continue to receive credible re-  
14 ports of sporadic violence in northern Rakhine  
15 State”.

16 (17) Amnesty International and Human Rights  
17 Watch have reported and documented a campaign of  
18 violence perpetuated by the security forces of Burma  
19 that “may amount to crimes against humanity” and  
20 “ethnic cleansing” and includes—

21 (A) indiscriminate attacks on civilians;

22 (B) rape of women and girls; and

23 (C) arbitrary arrest and detention of  
24 Rohingya men without charge.

1           (18) According to Human Rights Watch, Bur-  
2           mese security forces have committed widespread  
3           rape against women and girls as part of a campaign  
4           of ethnic cleansing against Rohingya Muslims in  
5           Burma's Rakhine State. Survivors said that soldiers  
6           gathered them together in groups and then raped or  
7           gang raped them.

8           (19) Because survivors of conflict-related sexual  
9           or gender-based violence know very little about the  
10          abusers, aside from identifying the abuser as a mem-  
11          ber of a military unit, existing laws and account-  
12          ability mechanisms often fail to protect victims of  
13          such violence.

14          (20) Satellite images captured by Human  
15          Rights Watch reveal that, out of the approximately  
16          470 villages in northern Rakhine State, most of  
17          which were completely or partially populated with  
18          Rohingya Muslims, nearly 300 were partially or  
19          completely destroyed by fire after August 25, 2017.

20          (21) The Government of Burma has continued  
21          to block access to northern Rakhine State by United  
22          Nations and other humanitarian organizations, pre-  
23          venting hundreds of thousands of vulnerable  
24          Rohingya, Rakhine, and other ethnic groups, includ-  
25          ing children with acute malnutrition, from receiving

1 humanitarian aid. According to a report by the  
2 United Nations Children’s Fund, a diphtheria out-  
3 break has led to 424 cases and 6 deaths since De-  
4 cember 6, 2017. In addition, the levels of global  
5 acute malnutrition in refugees from Burma exceeds  
6 the World Health Organization’s threshold by 15  
7 percent in children aged 6–59 months. Over 50 per-  
8 cent of the Rohingya children are reported to be suf-  
9 fering from anemia.

10 (22) In response to previous violence between  
11 the Burmese military and the ethnic Rohingya peo-  
12 ple in 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi established the Ad-  
13 visory Commission on Rakhine State headed by  
14 former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi  
15 Annan to address tensions in Northern Rakhine. She  
16 has since also endorsed the Commission’s rec-  
17 ommendations and established an “Advisory Team  
18 for the Committee for the Implementation of Rec-  
19 ommendations on Rakhine State” to move forward  
20 with implementation.

21 (23) On December 21, 2017, using the author-  
22 ity granted by the Global Magnitsky Human Rights  
23 Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public  
24 Law 114–328), the President imposed sanctions on  
25 Maung Maung Soe, a Major General who was the

1 chief of the Burmese Army’s Western command dur-  
2 ing the August 2017 attack in Rakhine state.

3 (24) On November 22, 2017, Secretary of State  
4 Rex Tillerson stated, “After careful and through  
5 analysis of available facts, it is clear that the situa-  
6 tion in northern Rakhine state constitutes ethnic  
7 cleansing against the Rohingya. Those responsible  
8 for these atrocities must be held accountable.”.

9 (25) Ethnic cleansing is a despicable evil, and  
10 while it is not an independent crime under domestic  
11 or international law, it is often accomplished  
12 through acts that constitute war crimes, crimes  
13 against humanity, or genocide, and the perpetrators  
14 of such crimes in Burma must be held accountable.

15 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

16 In this Act:

17 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
18 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
19 mittees” means—

20 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations  
21 and the Committee on Armed Services of the  
22 Senate; and

23 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
24 the Committee on Armed Services of the House  
25 of Representatives.

1           (2) GENOCIDE.—The term “genocide” means  
2 any offense described in section 1091(a) of title 18,  
3 United States Code.

4           (3) HYBRID TRIBUNAL.—The term “hybrid tri-  
5 bunal” means a temporary criminal tribunal that in-  
6 volves a combination of domestic and international  
7 lawyers, judges, and other professionals to prosecute  
8 individuals suspected of committing war crimes,  
9 crimes against humanity, or genocide.

10           (4) TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE.—The term “tran-  
11 sitional justice” means the range of judicial, non-  
12 judicial, formal, informal, retributive, and restorative  
13 measures employed by countries transitioning out of  
14 armed conflict or repressive regimes—

15                   (A) to redress legacies of atrocities; and

16                   (B) to promote long-term, sustainable  
17 peace.

18           (5) WAR CRIME.—The term “war crime” has  
19 the meaning given the term in section 2441(c) of  
20 title 18, United States Code.

21 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

22 It is the policy of the United States that—

23           (1) the pursuit of a calibrated engagement  
24 strategy is essential to support the establishment of  
25 a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that

1 includes respect for the human rights of all its peo-  
2 ple regardless of ethnicity and religion; and

3 (2) the guiding principles of such a strategy in-  
4 clude—

5 (A) support for meaningful legal and con-  
6 stitutional reforms that remove remaining re-  
7 strictions on civil and political rights and insti-  
8 tute civilian control of the military, civilian con-  
9 trol of the government, and the constitutional  
10 provision reserving 25 percent of parliamentary  
11 seats for the military, which provides the mili-  
12 tary with veto power over constitutional amend-  
13 ments;

14 (B) the establishment of a fully demo-  
15 cratic, pluralistic, civilian controlled, and rep-  
16 resentative political system that includes regu-  
17 larized free and fair elections in which all peo-  
18 ple of Burma, including the Rohingya, can vote;

19 (C) the promotion of genuine national rec-  
20 onciliation and conclusion of a credible and sus-  
21 tainable nationwide ceasefire agreement, polit-  
22 ical accommodation of the needs of ethnic Shan,  
23 Kachin, Chin, Karen, and other ethnic groups,  
24 safe and voluntary return of displaced persons

1 to villages of origins, and constitutional change  
2 allowing inclusive permanent peace;

3 (D) investigations into credible reports of  
4 ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, sex-  
5 ual and gender-based violence, and genocide  
6 perpetrated against ethnic minorities like the  
7 Rohingya by the government, military, and se-  
8 curity forces of Burma, violent extremist  
9 groups, and other combatants involved in the  
10 conflict;

11 (E) accountability for determinations of  
12 ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, sex-  
13 ual and gender-based violence, and genocide  
14 perpetrated against ethnic minorities like the  
15 Rohingya by the Government, military, and se-  
16 curity forces of Burma, violent extremist  
17 groups, and other combatants involved in the  
18 conflict;

19 (F) strengthening the government's civilian  
20 institutions, including support for greater trans-  
21 parency and accountability;

22 (G) the establishment of professional and  
23 nonpartisan military, security, and police forces  
24 that operate under civilian control;

1 (H) empowering local communities, civil  
2 society, and independent media;

3 (I) promoting responsible international and  
4 regional engagement;

5 (J) strengthening respect for and protec-  
6 tion of human rights and religious freedom;

7 (K) addressing and ending the humani-  
8 tarian and human rights crisis, including by  
9 supporting the return of the displaced Rohingya  
10 to their homes and providing equal access to  
11 restoration of full citizenship for the Rohingya  
12 population; and

13 (L) promoting broad-based, inclusive eco-  
14 nomic development and fostering healthy and  
15 resilient communities.

16 **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**  
17 **AND RECONCILIATION.**

18 (a) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be  
20 appropriated \$103,695,069 for fiscal year 2018 for  
21 humanitarian assistance for Burma, Bangladesh,  
22 and the region. The assistance may include—

23 (A) assistance for the victims of the Bur-  
24 mese military's ethnic cleansing campaign tar-  
25 geting Rohingya in Rakhine State, including

1 those displaced in Bangladesh, Burma, and the  
2 region;

3 (B) support for voluntary resettlement or  
4 repatriation efforts regionally; and

5 (C) humanitarian assistance to victims of  
6 violence and destruction in Rakhine State, in-  
7 cluding victims of gender-based violence and  
8 unaccompanied minors.

9 (2) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL  
10 FUNDING.—It is the sense of Congress that addi-  
11 tional significant and sustained funding will be nec-  
12 essary to address the medium and long-term impacts  
13 of this crisis.

14 (b) RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS.—There is author-  
15 ized to be appropriated \$27,400,000 for fiscal year 2018  
16 for reconciliation programs in Burma. The assistance may  
17 include—

18 (1) reducing the influence of the drivers of  
19 intercommunal conflict;

20 (2) strengthening engagement on areas affect-  
21 ing fundamental freedoms;

22 (3) enhancing the ability of key stakeholders to  
23 engage in the peace process; and

24 (4) assisting the implementation of the Kofi  
25 Annan Commission report.

1 **SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE.**

2 The Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the  
3 United States executive director of each international fi-  
4 nancial institution to use the voice and vote of the United  
5 States to support projects in Burma that—

6 (1) provide for accountability and transparency,  
7 including the collection, verification and publication  
8 of beneficial ownership information related to extrac-  
9 tive industries and on-site monitoring during the life  
10 of the project;

11 (2) will be developed and carried out in accord-  
12 ance with best practices regarding environmental  
13 conservation, cultural protection, and empowerment  
14 of local populations, including free, prior, and in-  
15 formed consent of affected indigenous communities;

16 (3) do not provide incentives for, or facilitate,  
17 forced displacement; and

18 (4) do not partner with or otherwise involve en-  
19 terprises owned or controlled by the armed forces.

20 **SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RIGHT OF RETURNEES**  
21 **AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.**

22 (a) RIGHT OF RETURN.—It is the sense of Congress  
23 that the Government of Burma, in collaboration with the  
24 regional and international community, including the  
25 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,  
26 should—

1           (1) ensure the dignified, safe, and voluntary re-  
2           turn of all those displaced from their homes, espe-  
3           cially from Rakhine State, without an unduly high  
4           burden of proof;

5           (2) offer to those who do not want to return  
6           meaningful opportunity to obtain appropriate com-  
7           pensation or restitution;

8           (3) not place returning Rohingya in DP camps  
9           or “model villages”, but instead make efforts to re-  
10          construct Rohingya villages as and where they were;

11          (4) keep any funds collected by the Government  
12          by harvesting the land previously owned and tended  
13          by Rohingya farmers for them upon their return;  
14          and

15          (5) fully implement all of the recommendations  
16          of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.

17          (b) FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES AND IN-  
18          TERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS.—Congress recognizes  
19          that the Government of Bangladesh has provided long-  
20          standing support and hospitality to people fleeing violence  
21          in Burma, and calls on the Government of Bangladesh—

22          (1) to ensure all refugees have freedom of  
23          movement and under no circumstance are subject to  
24          unsafe, involuntary, or uninformed repatriation; and

1           (2) to ensure the dignified, safe, and voluntary  
2           return of those displaced from their homes, and  
3           offer to those who do not want to return meaningful  
4           means to obtain compensation or restitution.

5 **SEC. 8. MILITARY COOPERATION.**

6           (a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided under sub-  
7           section (b), the President may not furnish any security  
8           assistance or to engage in any military-to-military pro-  
9           grams with the armed forces of Burma, including training  
10          or observation or participation in regional exercises, until  
11          the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary  
12          of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional com-  
13          mittees that the Burmese military has demonstrated sig-  
14          nificant progress in abiding by international human rights  
15          standards and is undertaking meaningful and significant  
16          security sector reform, including transparency and ac-  
17          countability to prevent future abuses, as determined by  
18          applying the following criteria:

19               (1) The military adheres to international  
20               human rights standards and pledges to stop future  
21               human rights violations.

22               (2) The military supports efforts to carry out  
23               meaningful and comprehensive investigations of  
24               credible reports of abuses and is taking steps to hold

1           accountable those in the Burmese military respon-  
2           sible for human rights violations.

3           (3) The military supports efforts to carry out  
4           meaningful and comprehensive investigations of re-  
5           ports of conflict-related sexual and gender-based vio-  
6           lence and is taking steps to hold accountable those  
7           in the Burmese military who failed to prevent, re-  
8           spond to, investigate, and prosecute violence against  
9           women, sexual violence, or other gender-based vio-  
10          lence.

11          (4) The Government of Burma, including the  
12          military, allows immediate and unfettered humani-  
13          tarian access to communities in areas affected by  
14          conflict, including Rohingya communities in Rakhine  
15          State.

16          (5) The Government of Burma, including the  
17          military, cooperates with the United Nations High  
18          Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant  
19          United Nations agencies to ensure the protection of  
20          displaced persons and the safe and voluntary return  
21          of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced per-  
22          sons.

23          (6) The Government of Burma, including the  
24          military, takes steps toward the implementation of

1 the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on  
2 Rakhine State.

3 (b) EXCEPTIONS.—

4 (1) CERTAIN EXISTING AUTHORITIES.—The  
5 Department of Defense may continue to conduct  
6 consultations based on the authorities under section  
7 1253 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck”  
8 McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for  
9 Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 22 U.S.C.  
10 2151 note).

11 (2) HOSPITALITY.—The United States Agency  
12 for International Development and the Department  
13 of State may provide assistance authorized by part  
14 I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.  
15 2151 et seq.) to support ethnic armed groups and  
16 the Burmese military for the purpose of supporting  
17 research, dialogues, meetings, and other activities re-  
18 lated to the Union Peace Conference, Political Dia-  
19 logues, and related processes, in furtherance of in-  
20 clusive, sustainable reconciliation.

21 (c) MILITARY REFORM.—The certification required  
22 under subsection (a) shall include a written justification  
23 in classified and unclassified form describing the Burmese  
24 military’s efforts to implement reforms, end impunity for

1 human rights violations, and increase transparency and  
2 accountability.

3 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act  
4 shall be construed to authorize Department of Defense as-  
5 sistance to the Government of Burma except as provided  
6 in this section.

7 (e) REPORT.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and  
10 every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State  
11 and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the ap-  
12 propriate congressional committees a report, in both  
13 classified and unclassified form, on the strategy and  
14 plans for military-to-military engagement between  
15 the United States Armed Forces and the military of  
16 Burma.

17 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under  
18 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

19 (A) A description and assessment of the  
20 Government of Burma's strategy for security  
21 sector reform, including as it relates to an end  
22 to involvement in the illicit trade in jade and  
23 other natural resources, reforms to end corrup-  
24 tion and illicit drug trafficking, and constitu-

1            tional reforms to ensure civilian control of the  
2            Government.

3            (B) A list of ongoing military activities  
4            conducted by the United States Government  
5            with the Government of Burma, and a descrip-  
6            tion of the United States strategy for future  
7            military-to-military engagements between the  
8            United States and Burma's military forces, in-  
9            cluding the military of Burma, the Burma Po-  
10          lice Force, and armed ethnic groups.

11          (C) An assessment of the progress of the  
12          military of Burma towards developing a frame-  
13          work to implement human rights reforms, in-  
14          cluding—

15                (i) cooperation with civilian authori-  
16                ties to investigate and prosecute cases of  
17                human rights violations;

18                (ii) steps taken to demonstrate respect  
19                for internationally-recognized human rights  
20                standards and implementation of and ad-  
21                herence to the laws of war; and

22                (iii) a description of the elements of  
23                the military-to-military engagement be-  
24                tween the United States and Burma that  
25                promote such implementation.

1           (D) An assessment of progress on the  
2 peaceful settlement of armed conflicts between  
3 the Government of Burma and ethnic minority  
4 groups, including actions taken by the military  
5 of Burma to adhere to ceasefire agreements,  
6 allow for safe and voluntary returns of dis-  
7 placed persons to their villages of origin, and  
8 withdraw forces from conflict zones.

9           (E) An assessment of the Burmese's mili-  
10 tary recruitment and use of children as soldiers.

11           (F) An assessment of the Burmese's mili-  
12 tary's use of violence against women, sexual vio-  
13 lence, or other gender-based violence as a tool  
14 of terror, war, or ethnic cleansing.

15       (f) CIVILIAN CHANNELS.—Any program initiated  
16 under this section shall use appropriate civilian govern-  
17 ment channels with the democratically elected Government  
18 of Burma.

19       (g) REGULAR CONSULTATIONS.—Any new program  
20 or activity in Burma initiated under this section shall be  
21 subject to prior consultation with the appropriate congres-  
22 sional committees.

1 **SEC. 9. REINSTATEMENT OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON**  
2 **JADEITE FROM BURMA.**

3 (a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 3A(a) of the Burmese  
4 Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–  
5 61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

6 (1) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the  
7 following:

8 “(2) BURMESE COVERED ARTICLE.—The term  
9 ‘Burmese covered article’ means—

10 “(A) jadeite mined or extracted from  
11 Burma; or

12 “(B) articles of jewelry containing jadeite  
13 described in subparagraph (A).”;

14 (2) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the  
15 following:

16 “(3) NON-BURMESE COVERED ARTICLE.—The  
17 term ‘non-Burmese covered article’ means—

18 “(A) jadeite mined or extracted from a  
19 country other than Burma; or

20 “(B) articles of jewelry containing jadeite  
21 described in subparagraph (A).”; and

22 (3) by striking paragraph (4) and inserting the  
23 following:

24 “(4) JADEITE; ARTICLES OF JEWELRY CON-  
25 TAINING JADEITE.—

1           “(A) JADEITE.—The term ‘jadeite’ means  
2           any jadeite classifiable under heading 7103 of  
3           the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United  
4           States (in this paragraph referred to as the  
5           ‘HTS’).

6           “(B) ARTICLES OF JEWELRY CONTAINING  
7           JADEITE.—The term ‘articles of jewelry con-  
8           taining jadeite’ means—

9                   “(i) any article of jewelry classifiable  
10                  under heading 7113 of the HTS that con-  
11                  tains jadeite; or

12                   “(ii) any article of jadeite classifiable  
13                  under heading 7116 of the HTS.”.

14           (b) TERMINATION.—Section 3A of the Burmese  
15           Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–  
16           61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking sub-  
17           sections (g) and (h) and inserting the following:

18           “(g) TERMINATION.—Notwithstanding section 9, this  
19           section shall remain in effect until the President deter-  
20           mines and certifies to the appropriate congressional com-  
21           mittees that the Government of Burma has taken meas-  
22           ures to reform the jadeite industry in Burma, including  
23           measures to require—

24                   “(1) the disclosure of the ultimate beneficial  
25                  ownership of entities in that industry; and

1           “(2) the publication of project revenues, pay-  
2           ments, and contract terms relating to that indus-  
3           try.”.

4           (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 3A of the  
5           Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public  
6           Law 108–61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

7           (1) in the section heading—

8                   (A) by striking “**AND RUBIES**”; and

9                   (B) by striking “**OR RUBIES**”;

10          (2) in subsection (b)—

11                   (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “until  
12                   such time” and all that follows through “2008”  
13                   and inserting “beginning on the date that is  
14                   180 days after the date of the enactment of the  
15                   Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of  
16                   2018”; and

17                   (B) in paragraph (3), by striking “the date  
18                   of the enactment of this Act” and inserting  
19                   “the date of the enactment of the Burma  
20                   Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2018”; and

21          (3) in subsection (c)—

22                   (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “until  
23                   such time” and all that follows through “2008”  
24                   and inserting “beginning on the date that is  
25                   180 days after the date of the enactment of the

1 Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of  
2 2018”; and

3 (B) in paragraph (2)(B)—

4 (i) in clause (ii), by striking “or pol-  
5 ished rubies”

6 (ii) by striking “or rubies” each place  
7 it appears.

8 **SEC. 10. VISA BAN AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WITH RE-**  
9 **SPECT TO MILITARY OFFICIALS RESPON-**  
10 **SIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.**

11 (a) LIST REQUIRED.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
14 President shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
15 sional committees a list of senior officials of the mili-  
16 tary and security forces of Burma that the President  
17 determines have knowingly played a direct and sig-  
18 nificant role in the commission of human rights vio-  
19 lations in Burma, including against the Rohingya  
20 minority population.

21 (2) INCLUSIONS.—The list required by para-  
22 graph (1) shall include all of the senior officials of  
23 the military and security forces of Burma—

24 (A) in charge of each unit that was oper-  
25 ational during the so-called “clearance oper-

1           ations” that began during or after October  
2           2016; and

3                   (B) who knew, or should have known, that  
4           the official’s subordinates were committing sex-  
5           ual or gender-based violence and failed to take  
6           adequate steps to prevent such violence or pun-  
7           ish the individuals responsible for such violence.

8           (3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than every  
9           180 days, the President shall submit to the appro-  
10          priate congressional committees an updated version  
11          of the list required by paragraph (1).

12          (b) SANCTIONS.—

13                   (1) VISA BAN.—The Secretary of State shall  
14          deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-  
15          rity shall exclude from the United States, any indi-  
16          vidual included in the most recent list required sub-  
17          section (a).

18                   (2) LIST OF SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATION-  
19          ALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS.—

20                   (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180  
21          days after the date of the enactment of this  
22          Act, the President shall—

23                           (i) determine whether the individuals  
24                           specified in subparagraph (B) should be  
25                           included on the SDN list; and

1                   (ii) submit to the appropriate congres-  
2                   sional committees a report, in classified  
3                   form if necessary, on the procedures for in-  
4                   cluding those individuals on the SDN list  
5                   under existing authorities of the Depart-  
6                   ment of the Treasury.

7                   (B) INDIVIDUALS SPECIFIED.—The indi-  
8                   viduals specified in this subparagraph are—

9                   (i) the head of each unit of the mili-  
10                  tary or security forces of Burma that was  
11                  operational during the so-called “clearance  
12                  operations” that began during or after Oc-  
13                  tober 2016, including—

14                         (I) Senior General Min Aung  
15                         Hlaing; and

16                         (II) Major General Khin Maung  
17                         Soe;

18                   (ii) any senior official of the military  
19                   or security forces of Burma for which the  
20                   President determines there are credible re-  
21                   ports that the official has aided, partici-  
22                   pated, or is otherwise implicated in gross  
23                   human rights violations in Burma, includ-  
24                   ing sexual and ethnic- or gender-based vio-  
25                   lence; and

1 (iii) any senior official of the military  
2 or security forces of Burma for which the  
3 President determines there are credible re-  
4 ports that the official knew, or should have  
5 known, that the official's subordinates  
6 were committing sexual or gender-based vi-  
7 olence and failed to take adequate steps to  
8 prevent such violence or punish the individ-  
9 uals responsible for such violence.

10 (3) AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL  
11 SANCTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may, in  
12 consultation with the Secretary of State, prohibit or  
13 impose strict conditions on the opening or maintain-  
14 ing in the United States of a correspondent account  
15 or payable-through account by any financial institu-  
16 tion that is a United States person, for or on behalf  
17 of a foreign financial institution, if the Secretary de-  
18 termines that the account is knowingly used—

19 (A) by a foreign financial institution that  
20 knowingly holds property or an interest in prop-  
21 erty of an individual included on the SDN list  
22 pursuant to paragraph (2); or

23 (B) to conduct a significant transaction on  
24 behalf of such an individual.

1           (4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this  
2 subsection may be construed to prohibit any contract  
3 or other financial transaction by a United States  
4 person with a credible nongovernmental humani-  
5 tarian organization in Burma.

6           (c) REMOVAL FROM LIST.—The President may re-  
7 move an individual from the list required by subsection  
8 (a) if the President determines and reports to the appro-  
9 priate congressional committees that—

10           (1) the individual has—

11                   (A) publicly acknowledged the role of the  
12 individual in committing past human rights vio-  
13 lations;

14                   (B) cooperated with independent efforts to  
15 investigate such violations;

16                   (C) been held accountable for such viola-  
17 tions; and

18                   (D) demonstrated substantial progress in  
19 reforming the individual’s behavior with respect  
20 to the protection of human rights in the con-  
21 duct of civil-military relations; and

22           (2) removing the individual from the list is in  
23 the national interest of the United States.

24           (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

1           (1) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—A require-  
2           ment to impose sanctions under this section shall  
3           not apply with respect to the provision of medicine,  
4           medical equipment or supplies, food, or any other  
5           form of humanitarian or human rights-related as-  
6           sistance provided to Burma in response to a humani-  
7           tarian crisis.

8           (2) UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREE-  
9           MENT.—Subsection (b)(1) shall not apply to the ad-  
10          mission of an individual to the United States if such  
11          admission is necessary to comply with United States  
12          obligations under the Agreement between the United  
13          Nations and the United States of America regarding  
14          the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at  
15          Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force  
16          November 21, 1947, or under the Convention on  
17          Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963,  
18          and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other  
19          international obligations of the United States.

20          (e) WAIVER.—The President may waive a require-  
21          ment of this section if the Secretary of State, in consulta-  
22          tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines and  
23          reports to the appropriate congressional committees that  
24          the waiver is important to the national security interests  
25          of the United States.

1 (f) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

2 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-  
3 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203  
4 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic  
5 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out  
6 this section.

7 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-  
8 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
9 violation of paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (b) or  
10 any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out  
11 either such paragraph shall be subject to the pen-  
12 alties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section  
13 206 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-  
14 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a  
15 person that commits an unlawful act described in  
16 subsection (a) of that section.

17 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This subsection  
18 shall not be construed to require the President to  
19 declare a national emergency under section 202 of  
20 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act  
21 (50 U.S.C. 1701).

22 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

23 (1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAY-  
24 ABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms “account”,  
25 “correspondent account”, and “payable-through ac-

1 count” have the meanings given those terms in sec-  
2 tion 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

3 (2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “fi-  
4 nancial institution” has the meaning given that term  
5 in section 5312 of title 31, United States Code.

6 (3) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with  
7 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,  
8 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should  
9 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the  
10 result.

11 (4) SDN LIST.—The term “SDN list” means  
12 the list of specially designated nationals and blocked  
13 persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets  
14 Control of the Department of the Treasury.

15 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
16 “United States person” means—

17 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-  
18 fully admitted for permanent residence to the  
19 United States;

20 (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
21 the United States or of any jurisdiction within  
22 the United States, including a foreign branch of  
23 such an entity; or

24 (C) any person in the United States.

1 **SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP-**  
2 **MENT.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,  
5 the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of  
6 the United States Agency for International Development  
7 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
8 a strategy to support sustainable and broad-based eco-  
9 nomic development, in accordance with the priorities of  
10 the Government of Burma to improve economic conditions.

11 (b) ELEMENTS.—In order to support the efforts of  
12 the Government of Burma, the strategy required by sub-  
13 section (a) shall include a plan to promote inclusive and  
14 responsible economic growth, including through the fol-  
15 lowing initiatives:

16 (1) Develop an economic reform road-map to  
17 diversify control over and access to participation in  
18 key industries and sectors. The United States Gov-  
19 ernment should support the Government of Burma  
20 to develop a roadmap to assess and recommend  
21 measures to remove barriers and increase competi-  
22 tion, access and opportunity in sectors dominated by  
23 the military, former military officials, and their fam-  
24 ilies, and businesspeople connected to the military.  
25 The roadmap should include areas related to govern-  
26 ment transparency, accountability, and governance.

1           (2) Increase transparency disclosure require-  
2           ments in key sectors to promote responsible invest-  
3           ment. Provide technical support to develop and im-  
4           plement policies, and revise existing policies on pub-  
5           lic disclosure of beneficial owners of companies in  
6           key sectors identified by the Government of Burma,  
7           including the identities of those seeking or securing  
8           access to Burma's most valuable resources. In the  
9           ruby industry, this specifically includes working with  
10          the Government of Burma to require the disclosure  
11          of the ultimate beneficial ownership of entities in the  
12          industry and the publication of project revenues,  
13          payments, and contract terms relating to the indus-  
14          try. Such new requirements should complement dis-  
15          closures due to be put in place in Burma as a result  
16          of its participation in the Extractives Industry  
17          Transparency Initiative (EITI).

18          (3) Promote universal access to reliable, afford-  
19          able, energy efficient, and sustainable power, includ-  
20          ing leveraging United States assistance to support  
21          reforms in the power sector and electrification  
22          projects that increase energy access, in partnership  
23          with multilateral organizations and the private sec-  
24          tor.

1 **SEC. 12. REPORT ON ETHNIC CLEANSING AND SERIOUS**  
2 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BURMA.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
5 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
6 a report detailing the credible reports of ethnic cleansing  
7 and serious human rights abuses committed against the  
8 Rohingya in Burma, including credible reports of war  
9 crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and on po-  
10 tential transnational justice mechanisms in Burma.

11 (b) ELEMENTS.—The reports required under sub-  
12 section (a) shall include—

13 (1) a description of credible reports of ethnic  
14 cleaning and serious human rights abuses per-  
15 petrated against the Rohingya ethnic minority in  
16 Burma, including—

17 (A) incidents that may constitute ethnic  
18 cleansing, crimes against humanity, sexual and  
19 gender-based violence, and genocide committed  
20 by the Burmese military, and other actors in-  
21 volved in the violence;

22 (B) the role of the civilian government in  
23 the commission of such activities;

24 (C) incidents that may constitute ethnic  
25 cleansing, crimes against humanity, sexual and  
26 gender-based violence, or genocide committed

1 by violent extremist groups or antigovernment  
2 forces;

3 (D) any incidents that may violate the  
4 principle of medical neutrality and, if possible,  
5 identification of the individual or individuals  
6 who engaged in or organized such incidents;  
7 and

8 (E) to the extent possible, a description of  
9 the conventional and unconventional weapons  
10 used for such crimes and the origins of such  
11 weapons;

12 (2) a description and assessment by the Depart-  
13 ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-  
14 national Development, the Department of Justice,  
15 and other appropriate Federal departments and  
16 agencies of programs that the United States Govern-  
17 ment has already or is planning to undertake to en-  
18 sure accountability for credible reports of ethnic  
19 cleansing and reports of war crimes, crimes against  
20 humanity, sexual and gender-based violence, and  
21 genocide perpetrated against the Rohingya and other  
22 ethnic minority groups by the Government, security  
23 forces, and military of Burma, violent extremist  
24 groups, and other combatants involved in the con-  
25 flict, including programs—

1           (A) to train investigators within and out-  
2 side of Burma and Bangladesh on how to docu-  
3 ment, investigate, develop findings of, and iden-  
4 tify and locate alleged perpetrators of ethnic  
5 cleansing, crimes against humanity, or genocide  
6 in Burma;

7           (B) to promote and prepare for a transi-  
8 tional justice process or processes for the per-  
9 petrators of ethnic cleansing, crimes against hu-  
10 manity, and genocide in Burma; and

11          (C) to document, collect, preserve, and pro-  
12 tect evidence of reports of ethnic cleansing,  
13 crimes against humanity, and genocide in  
14 Burma, including support for Burmese and  
15 Bangladeshi, foreign, and international non-  
16 governmental organizations, the United Nations  
17 Human Rights Council's investigative team,  
18 and other entities; and

19          (3) A detailed study of the feasibility and desir-  
20 ability of potential transitional justice mechanisms  
21 for Burma, including a hybrid tribunal, and rec-  
22 ommendations on which transitional justice mecha-  
23 nisms the United States Government should sup-  
24 port, why such mechanisms should be supported,  
25 and what type of support should be offered.

1 (c) PROTECTION OF WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE.—

2 The Secretary shall take due care to ensure that the iden-  
3 tification of witnesses and physical evidence are not pub-  
4 licly disclosed in a manner that might place such persons  
5 at risk of harm or encourage the destruction of evidence  
6 by the Government of Burma.

7 **SEC. 13. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-  
9 sultation with the Department of Justice and other appro-  
10 priate Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to  
11 provide appropriate assistance to support entities that,  
12 with respect to credible reports of ethnic cleansing, crimes  
13 against humanity, and genocide perpetrated by the mili-  
14 tary, security forces, and Government of Burma, Buddhist  
15 militias, and all other armed groups fighting in Rakhine  
16 State—

17 (1) identify suspected perpetrators of ethnic  
18 cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and  
19 genocide;

20 (2) collect, document, and protect evidence of  
21 crimes and preserve the chain of custody for such  
22 evidence;

23 (3) conduct criminal investigations; and

24 (4) support investigations by third-party states,  
25 as appropriate.

1 (b) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of  
2 State, after consultation with appropriate Federal depart-  
3 ments and agencies and the appropriate congressional  
4 committees, and taking into account the findings of the  
5 transitional justice study required under section 12(b)(3),  
6 is authorized to provide assistance to support the creation  
7 and operation of transitional justice mechanisms for  
8 Burma.

9 **SEC. 14. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRESS FREEDOM.**

10 In order to promote freedom of the press in Burma,  
11 it is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo should be im-  
13 mediately released and should have access to lawyers  
14 and their families; and

15 (2) the decision to use a colonial-era law to ar-  
16 rest these Reuters reporters undermines press free-  
17 dom around the world and further underscores the  
18 need for serious legal reform.

19 **SEC. 15. MEASURES RELATING TO MILITARY COOPERATION**  
20 **BETWEEN BURMA AND NORTH KOREA.**

21 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may, with re-  
23 spect to any person described in paragraph (2)—

24 (A) impose the sanctions described in para-  
25 graph (1) or (3) of section 10(b); or

1 (B) include that person on the SDN list  
2 (as defined in section 10(g)).

3 (2) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described  
4 in this paragraph is an official of the Government of  
5 Burma or an individual or entity acting on behalf of  
6 that Government that the President determines pur-  
7 chases or otherwise acquires defense articles from  
8 the Government of North Korea or an individual or  
9 entity acting on behalf of that Government.

10 (b) RESTRICTION ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The  
11 President may terminate or reduce the provision of United  
12 States foreign assistance to Burma if the President deter-  
13 mines that the Government of Burma does not verifiably  
14 and irreversibly eliminate all purchases or other acquisi-  
15 tions of defense articles by persons described in subsection  
16 (a)(2) from the Government of North Korea or individuals  
17 or entities acting on behalf of that Government.

18 (c) DEFENSE ARTICLE DEFINED.—In this section,  
19 the term “defense article” has the meaning given that  
20 term in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22  
21 U.S.C. 2794).

22 **SEC. 16. NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY**  
23 **FORCE.**

24 Nothing in this Act shall be construed as an author-  
25 ization for the use of force.